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Educational policy depends on assumptions about fairness in education, whether
they are made explicit or kept implicit. Without a view of fairness, one would be
in the dark as to what should be done about the reproduction of social inequality
through education, or whether or not anything should be done at all. The aim of
this paper is to uncover the view of fairness in Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) education policy. It is based on an anal-
ysis of the normative argumentation concerning educational fairness in a set of
policy documents from the last seven years, with special emphasis on the associ-
ation between social background and educational achievement. The main result
of the analysis is that the OECD explicitly operate with a loose idea of equal
opportunity, compatible with even a merely formal equality, but implicitly with a
meritocratic variant of fair equality of opportunity. In the ﬁnal section, I argue
that the OECD approach to fairness suffers from a limitation in that it considers
educational justice in isolation from social justice in general.
Keywords: equity; fairness; justice; education policy; equality of opportunity;
argumentation analysis; OECD
Public policy documents serve many functions. It would be naive to suppose that
for instance government white papers are motivated purely by the demands of ratio-
nality. Yet, although there are other forces at play in policy-making than the force of
the better argument, policy documents also include an argumentative aspect. Usu-
ally, one small but crucial part of that argumentation is normative; that is, about
what is right and wrong, just and unjust, fair and unfair. In this paper, I explore the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) position on
equity in education. It is based on an analysis of the normative argumentation con-
cerning educational fairness in a set of policy documents from the last seven years,
with special emphasis on the association between social background and educational
achievement. My aim is to identify the precise content, if there is such a thing, of
the concept of fairness at work in the documents.
Background: OECD education policy
In the last decades, education policy has become largely globalised (Ozga and
Lingard 2007; Lingard and Sellar 2013). One aspect of this process is the increased
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inﬂuence of international organisations. Prime among these, at least in the afﬂuent
world, is the OECD. Although the OECD do not make binding decisions but only
policy recommendations, they are one of several organisations that have contributed
to ‘policy convergence’ across nations (Grek 2009). No longer a mere think-tank or
data centre, the OECD are now a signiﬁcant policy actor, spearheading what has
been called ‘a global education policy ﬁeld’ (Lingard 2011, 368).
Within the sociology of education policy, the OECD are often seen as the main
proponent of ‘the global education reform movement’ (Sahlberg 2011, 99), a neolib-
eral approach prescribing privatisation, competition, and accountability through test-
ing. Framing this development is a human capital perspective. On this view, the
economy has (and should) become more knowledge-based, and education is accord-
ingly seen as a part of economic policy. This leads to what Sellar and Lingard
(2013b, 5) succinctly phrase as both the ‘economisation’ of education policy and the
‘educationising’ of economic policy. The main vehicle of OECD’s inﬂuence on edu-
cation policy has been its assessment programmes, which facilitate comparison of
educational performance across nations. PISA, in particular, now commands a
signiﬁcance far beyond that of a mere informative basis for decision-making. Rather,
quantitative comparison has become a mode of governance itself (Nóvoa and
Yariv-Mashal 2003), constituting what Grek (2009) calls ‘governing by numbers’.
True, this movement has been most pronounced in the Anglo-American countries
and to a lesser degree elsewhere, such as the Nordic countries, but its inﬂuence has
been felt even there.
Yet, the OECD have also been more and more concerned with equity in educa-
tion, both in dedicated reports and as part of PISA. A critical question is whether
this concern complements or conﬂicts with the general neoliberal thrust of OECD
education policy. How does the emphasis on equity ﬁt with the picture of the OECD
as one of the main agents of the marketisation of education? The OECD themselves
see equity in education both as an ‘end in itself’ and as a harmonious complement
to the pursuit of economic efﬁciency (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 32). Some
scholars seem to agree. Chapman and Aspin (2013, 150), for instance, regard the
OECD’s work on equity as an attempt to balance the economic perspective on edu-
cation with ‘broader human and social concerns’. In this perspective, equity is con-
sidered necessary to optimise economic growth, since inequities imply that human
resources are left unused.
Others are more critical. Savage, Sellar, and Gorur (2013) acknowledge that
PISA has highlighted issues of inequity, such as the persistent association between
social background and educational performance, but claim that the OECD’s equity
discourse has been co-opted into economic rationality. They see the growing social
inequality in member countries as evidence that the OECD’s promotion of equity
‘sits uneasily’ with their neoliberal agenda of market reform (163). Rizvi and
Lingard (2009, 448) likewise argue that within the OECD framework, equality is no
longer regarded as a moral value in its own right, but only as ‘a means to human
capital development’, and that the OECD notion of equity is therefore ‘too narrow’.
In the same vein, Rizvi (2013) describes this development as a shift from a social
democratic to a market conception of equity. Equity has become separated from tra-
ditional ideas of social justice and re-articulated as formal access to education and
participation in markets.
My own contribution to this debate is to shed light on the OECD notion of
equity by way of a close textual analysis of selected policy documents. To be sure,
Journal of Education Policy 857
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textual analysis is far from sufﬁcient to determine actual policy, since policy
documents are always embedded within a larger political, ideological, and historical
context, but it is a necessary prerequisite. As will become clear, the conclusion of
this study will be a partial concession to the critical view. On one hand, there is a
quite demanding conception of fairness in the OECD, and a stronger one than they
sometimes get credit for. On the other hand, the critics are right that the OECD
conception of fairness is deﬁned in isolation from social justice in general.
The normative problem
Next, a few words about the underlying normative problem: one of the most well-
known and well-established ﬁndings from the sociology of education is that educa-
tional performance is highly correlated with social background (Esping-Andersen
2004).1 Most people will intuitively feel that there is something morally ﬁshy about
such correlations. Yet, it is hard to say exactly why it is wrong, unfair, or unjust.
Hence, it is also hard to determine exactly when correlations of this kind are evi-
dence of injustice, and when, if ever, they are not. We might for instance agree that
it would be deeply unfair if skin colour in itself systematically inﬂuenced educa-
tional performance and thereby later status in society. We might also agree, although
this is more controversial, that it would not be unfair if study effort inﬂuenced edu-
cational achievement; that, in many people’s view, is exactly as it should be. But
where, in between these two poles, do we cross the line from fair to unfair? Which
factors can legitimately inﬂuence achievement? Innate talents? Parental income?
Parental education? Homework support?
This normative problem is debated within political philosophy, for instance by
Rawls (1971), Sen (1997), Roemer (1998), Arneson (1999) and Brighouse and Swift
(2006, 2009). Much of this debate has centred on the notion of equality of opportu-
nity, which, in various forms, ﬁgures prominently in theories ranging from tradi-
tional meritocratic views to more recent ‘luck-egalitarian’ views (Mason 2001).
Regrettably, this philosophical debate has largely proceeded in splendid isolation
from actual education policy.2 This is unfortunate, since education policy depends
(among many other things, of course) on assumptions about fairness in education,
whether they are made explicit or kept implicit. Without a view of fairness, one
would be in the dark as to what should be done about the reproduction of inequality
through education, or whether or not anything should be done at all. The aim of this
paper is to uncover the view of fairness in OECD educational policy documents.
How do the OECD answer, explicitly or implicitly, the questions above? As we shall
see in the analysis to come, the OECD documents also operate with a notion of fair-
ness as equality of opportunity. We must therefore begin by introducing some termi-
nology and clariﬁcations regarding this troublesome concept.
When asked, most people support the idea of equal opportunity. However, that
agreement is largely verbal, since ‘equal opportunity’ can take on very different
meanings. A common distinction is that between formal and fair equality of oppor-
tunity, but here I shall instead adapt a tripartite division made by Swift (2006,
98–106). Note, though, that Swift is concerned with equal opportunity in general,
whereas this paper is restricted to educational opportunity. Obviously, there are close
links between educational success and occupational success, and those links are part
of what makes educational fairness important. Nevertheless, the question of social
justice in general, including the fairness of correlations between social background
858 S. Bøyum
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and social status (e.g. income differences), raises additional problems that would
complicate my analysis here to the point of becoming unmanageable. In this paper,
therefore, equality of opportunity will mean equality of educational opportunity.
Minimal equality of opportunity includes what is often called ‘formal’ equality,
that is, the absence of legal restrictions on educational access, but is already broader.
Minimal equality refers to the type of equality that is undermined not only by dis-
criminating laws, but also by prejudice and informal discrimination. The key norma-
tive idea is that class, gender, or ethnicity should neither determine whether one
receives a good education, e.g. access to higher education, nor how one is treated
within educational institutions, e.g. in grade-setting. Minimal equality of opportunity
can thus be summarised as the view that a competent student from a poor family
should have the same educational chances as a similarly competent child from a
wealthy family.
Fair equality of opportunity goes a step further. The difference between fair and
minimal equality of opportunity can be captured by a distinction between compe-
tence (actual or realised knowledge and skills) and talent (natural or potential).
Whereas minimal equality is the view that performance (length of education and
grades achieved) should be a function of competence, fair equality is the view that
performance and competence should be a function of talent (and effort). The crucial
implication is that according to the principle of fair equality of opportunity, one’s
opportunities to acquire competence should be independent of family background.
To achieve this, the elimination of prejudice and discrimination is insufﬁcient; rather,
the playing ﬁeld must be levelled by compensating disadvantaged children. To sum
up, a talented child from a poor family should have the same educational chances as
a similarly talented child from a wealthy family.
Finally, the principle of radical equality of opportunity says that opportunities
should exclusively be a function of people’s choices, in particular how much effort
they choose to exert. The key idea behind this principle is the following: since the
talent you are born with is just as much a matter of luck as the family you are born
into, one should, for the sake of consistency, compensate for talent as well. Educa-
tional opportunities should be a function of choice and effort alone. The implication
is that the inﬂuence of natural talent should also be equalised or neutralised. Radical
equality of opportunity can thus be summarised as the view that a less talented child
should have the same educational opportunities as a more talented child.
Material and method
The OECD policy document to be analysed in this paper is primarily No More
Failures: Ten Steps to Equity in Education (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007), but also
Tertiary Education for the Knowledge Society (OECD 2008), Equity and Quality in
Education (OECD 2012a) and Education Today 2013: The OECD Perspective
(OECD 2012b) will be examined. These documents overlap to a considerable degree
with respect to fairness. The ﬁrst contains the most thorough treatment (though not
as thorough as one could have hoped for), and many of its formulations are repeated
in the later documents. I shall not attempt to trace the origin of those formulations,
but the OECD’s notion of fairness seems to be based on Levin (2003). However, I
have not included an analysis of that text here, since it is not an ofﬁcial OECD pub-
lication, but a paper commissioned by the OECD.3
Journal of Education Policy 859
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The approach of this study may be unfamiliar to some readers, since it is a
combination of philosophical argument and policy document analysis. Philosophers
are not used to drawing on empirical material in their discussions; they are usually
more at home with imaginary examples, in part for good reasons. Empirical
researchers on the other hand will sometimes be tentative about unabashed moral
discussion, even though they are often motivated in their work by moral concerns.
In particular, researchers who are accustomed to analysing political documents will
perhaps be wary of talking about the moral content of policy documents, which are
often seen as belonging to the nitty–gritty world of political power games. A norma-
tive analysis may seem to them to be naive, as though the documents were taken
purely at face value with no notice of darker motives and hidden messages.
Naturally, the question of the role of moral or normative conceptions in policy or
policy documents – or for that matter the role of policy documents in policy – is a
far too complex question for me to attempt to answer here. The basic assumption
for this paper is fairly modest: policy documents often include normative elements,
and these play an important argumentative role within the documents, even if they
may play a less crucial role in the actual implementation of policy. Moreover, it is
important to bring these normative elements out into the open, not least in order to
confront actual policy with them.
As mentioned, this paper is based on an analysis of the normative argumentation
in a set of policy documents. However, argumentative analysis, especially of norma-
tive argumentation, and even more so of policy documents, is no mechanical exer-
cise. Rather, it can be described as a logical–hermeneutical art form. Despite its not
being a technique, however, we can distinguish some of its characteristic stages. For
the sake of simplicity, a full argumentation analysis may be said to involve four
main steps.
The ﬁrst step is identiﬁcation. Here, we attempt to identify the various parts of
the argumentative structure: claims, reasons, and evidence. At this stage, we are
exclusively at the explicit level, in the sense that we stick to how the claims and rea-
sons are actually formulated. The second step is reconstruction. Here, we attempt to
reconstruct the argument as a whole: how the premises and conclusions are related
to each other, as well as the relations between the various arguments and sub-argu-
ments.4 At this stage, we are partly at an implicit level, since the relations between
the various premises, conclusions, and sub-arguments are often not explicitly stated.
This means that in the case of complicated arguments, such as those in policy docu-
ments, there may be several possible reconstructions, each equally true to the source
material. The third step is articulation. Here, we want to get a more precise and spe-
ciﬁc grasp of the premises by drawing out their implicit content, but also to identify
implicit premises in the argument. ‘Implicit’ does not refer here to something behind
the text, for example, the intentions or motivations of its creators, but what can be
discerned from the text itself, by considering the context of each premise and the
relation between the parts of the argument, especially how the premises function in
the argument as a whole. The fourth step is evaluation; that is, the assessment of
whether or not the argument or arguments are valid and sound. I will not go into
detail here, since my analysis does not move beyond the three ﬁrst steps.
To perform a full analysis of a complete policy document would be extremely
time-consuming; a document contains hundreds, if not thousands, of premises and
conclusions, in a complicated web of arguments and sub-arguments. My aim is
therefore to focus on only one part of the argumentative structure of the documents.
860 S. Bøyum
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Nevertheless, some general ideas about what argumentation looks like are still
necessary in order to identify what to look for in the documents. In this paper,
Douglas Walton’s model of ethical argumentation has been used as a tool of analysis
(Walton 2003). Yet, since the aim of the paper is not to analyse – and even less to
evaluate – the entire argumentative structure of the relevant documents, but more
modestly to identify and articulate clearly just one premise of that argument, I shall
only employ those parts of Walton’s model that are relevant to identify and clarify
the speciﬁcally moral principles involved. I shall not, for instance, extend my inter-
est to the reasons for those principles, or what Walton (2003) calls ‘sub-inferences’.
Hence, only the ﬁrst three steps above are relevant here.
The explicit level
The methodological leitmotif of this paper is that public policy documents can be
seen as instances of practical ethical reasoning. In its simplest form, ethical argu-
ment, as a kind of practical deliberation, has the following structure, which also pro-
vides the core of more complex models:
P1: Moral principle (It is wrong to lie for personal advantage)
P2: Situation description (She’s mad at me, but if I tell her a lie, she’ll stop)
C: Action prescription (Tell her the truth anyway).
My aim is not to evaluate the argumentative structure of the policy documents,
but rather to identify it, and moreover to identify only one part of it, namely P1.
Hence, I shall not address the difﬁcult question of whether or not such arguments
can or are even meant to be deductively valid. According to Walton (2003, xiii), eth-
ical argumentation is best seen as ‘abductive’. Unlike a deductive argument, the
truth of the premises in an abductive argument does not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion, but gives us at best good reasons to accept it. Thus, even valid ethical
arguments are not proofs. There are no guarantees that they will be met with unison
agreement.
A policy document is obviously much more complex than the simpliﬁed exam-
ple above suggests. Nevertheless, even in policy documents, the same core structure
can be discerned; we come to a conclusion about what to do on the basis of how we
think things actually are and a general moral rule. In the case of the OECD, it can
be laid out like this:
P1: Moral principle: the equity principles
P2: Empirical studies on educational performance and effects of background
C: Policy recommendations: the ten steps to equity in education.
The conclusion (C) in the OECD documents, then, amounts to the so-called ‘Ten
Steps’, which involve among other things limitation of early tracking, management of
school choice, strengthening of links between school and home, and the directing of
resources to the students with the greatest needs (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 9).
This conclusion is based on the empirical studies (P2). Most of these fall into two
groups: comparisons of educational performance among OECD member states, and
studies on the relation between educational performance and background variables
Journal of Education Policy 861
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(sex, ethnicity, class, and so on, but also national policies such as school choice and
public expenditure on education).
Clearly, P2 alone does not imply C. The empirical data themselves are practi-
cally inert unless combined with principles that judge the present state of affairs as
inefﬁcient or unjust, such as for instance the fact that some children leave school
without being able to read properly, or that children from middle-class homes do
better in the educational system than do those from working-class homes. The ques-
tion that this paper sets out to answer is: what exactly are these principles in the case
of the OECD? What amounts to P1 in the relevant policy documents?
At the ﬁrst and explicit level, the role of P1 in the OECD policy documents is
played by the notion of equity. In OECD parlance, equity has two dimensions, fair-
ness and inclusion, that correspond to two moral principles. The principle of fairness
states that ‘personal and social circumstances – for example gender, socio-economic
status or ethnic origin – should not be an obstacle to achieving educational potential’
(Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 11). The principle of inclusion states that there
should be ‘a basic minimum standard of education for all – for example that
everyone should be able to read, write and do simple arithmetic’ (Field, Pont, and
Kuczera 2007, 11).
It must be said that although OECD argue that these two dimensions of equity
are closely intertwined in that they tend to reinforce each other in practice, it is still
puzzling that they are combined into a single concept (Field, Pont, and Kuczera
2007, 11; OECD 2012a, 16). Fairness and inclusion are logically independent of
each other, and it is easy to imagine cases where they pull in different directions.
Within political philosophy, there is a debate about which of these two principles –
there called equality and adequacy – should override the other if they conﬂict
(Anderson 2004; Brighouse and Swift 2009). With their terminology, however, the
OECD make it hard even to see that there is a problem.5
The part of P1 that we are concerned with here is the principle of fairness. At
this stage of the analysis, this principle is still quite loose. If we restrict ourselves to
social background, for instance as measured by parental income and level of educa-
tion, all we know at this point is that background should not be an obstacle or bar-
rier in education. That formulation is compatible with the most formal equality of
opportunity, mandating only the removal of legal obstacles, but also with a very
strong principle of equality, that demands that social background should have no sta-
tistical effect whatsoever. So far, though, we cannot know which interpretation is
correct, and thus what the 10 steps are meant to lead to. It is however difﬁcult to get
a more speciﬁc idea of P1 in the OECD documents, since the authors seem to suffer
from a kind of moral forgetfulness. The moral aspects and elements are there, but
they are neither justiﬁed, nor elaborated, nor speciﬁed, and they take up much less
space than do the empirical evidence and policy recommendations, even though (or
perhaps exactly because) it is here we ﬁnd the real controversies. As I shall demon-
strate, more sophisticated tools of analysis might however be able to unlock the
more speciﬁc idea of fairness at play in the OECD documents.
The implicit level
Moral argumentation is often circular, in the sense that there is a dialectic interplay
between more general and more particular judgements. General judgements are sup-
ported by particular judgements, and vice versa. That does not have to be taken as
862 S. Bøyum
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proof of defectiveness. Rawls (1974) famously emphasised the same justiﬁcatory
interdependence between judgements at different levels of abstraction in moral rea-
soning, and in effect distinguished good circularity from bad through whether the
general and the particular are in reﬂective equilibrium or not. More important for
our purposes, general and particular judgements can at times even constitute each
other. What is meant by a general judgement might ﬁrst become clear when seen
together with the particular judgements it is held to imply.6 The holistic or circular
character of moral reasoning means that P2 and C can take part in determining the
exact content of P1. Which empirical studies are chosen and which policy measures
are recommended may, therefore, play a constitutive role in clarifying the principle
of fairness from which OECD work.7
On this background, we may hope that we can achieve a progressive speciﬁca-
tion of the content of the OECD’s principle of fairness by considering both the role
of cited empirical studies and the work that the policy recommendations are sup-
posed to do. In Walton’s terminology, we are trying to work out the implicit classiﬁ-
catory assumption regarding the key term in the moral premise: ‘obstacles’. Unlike
for example ‘challenge’, obstacle is here a negatively loaded emotive term.8 The
documents do not however tell us much about which personal and social circum-
stances count as obstacles. Is your genome an obstacle? Are your parents, and if so,
when? Such questions are never explicitly answered by the policy documents, but
we can come a long way towards reconstructing an answer from their use of empiri-
cal evidence and proposed policies. When we attend to contextual elements in this
way, a more subtle and stronger conception of fairness is revealed in the OECD doc-
uments. What seems at ﬁrst a vague and undemanding position turns out to be rather
egalitarian. Whether or not its policy recommendations are adequate to realise the
demands implicit in its conception of fairness, however, is a matter that falls outside
the scope of this paper.
As a ﬁrst step towards limiting the range of possible interpretations of obstacle,
we can look at the general use of empirical evidence on correlations between back-
ground and performance. We saw above that the explicit OECD principle of fairness
is compatible with a mere formal equality of opportunity. However, if the OECD
only assumed a formal principle, we could not even tell from the provided statistical
evidence regarding the effect of social background that the principle of fairness is
violated within the OECD today, given the fact that no OECD country has, as far as
I know, laws that for example prohibit working-class students from entering univer-
sity. Yet, since it is clear from the context that the OECD do treat the statistical
material as evidence for a violation of the principle of fairness, the formal interpreta-
tion of the principle is excluded (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 41–42). Hence, by
obstacles, the OECD cannot merely mean legal obstacles.
We can limit the range of interpretations further by noting that there is one kind
of obstacle that is not regarded as an unfair inﬂuence on educational achievement:
natural talent. The OECD state that ‘accidents’ should be overcome in education,
but an exception is made for talent. This is partly explicit in the OECD principle of
fairness itself, which states that personal and social circumstances should not be an
obstacle to achieving educational potential (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 11).
Since one of the measures that the OECD recommend in order to promote fairness
is early childhood education and care, we must conclude that ‘educational potential’
refers to potential at a very early stage (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 21). Hence,
it seems reasonable to interpret educational potential as referring to native talents or
Journal of Education Policy 863
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abilities. This interpretation gains further support from Equity and Quality, where an
equitable education system is described as one ‘where individuals can improve their
socio-economic situation on a basis of merit’ (OECD 2012a, 26). Since merit is
commonly deﬁned as talent plus effort, this meritocratic reading is strengthened by
Tertiary Education, where it is said (though only with respect to higher education)
that in an equitable education system, participation and outcomes are only based on
‘individuals’ innate ability and study effort’ (OECD 2008, 14). If the OECD think
that innate ability is what should count even at the tertiary level, the principle of
charity leads us to assume that the OECD also think that it is what should count at
lower levels, since the latter is, if anything, more reasonable than the former.
Concerning effort, we cannot however reason in the same way. Whereas it may
seem reasonable to assume that effort is what should count at the tertiary level,
where students are responsible adults, it seems less reasonable to assume that it
should be what counts at lower levels. Effort is largely determined by motivation,
and motivation for education, at least in smaller children, can be held to be partly or
even largely determined by social background. That may be why effort is only men-
tioned in the analysed documents with regard to tertiary education (OECD 2012a,
26). For that reason, and also because the question of whether or not we are respon-
sible for our effort so easily takes us into general philosophical questions regarding
free will, we shall disregard effort here. What is not in doubt is that the OECD doc-
uments consider natural talent (or potential) as a factor, indeed, the factor, that
should condition educational attainment.
The precise meaning of obstacle can be circumscribed to an even greater extent
by considering the treatment of particular studies and policies in the documents. We
shall not however go through all the statistics and recommendations, since they
overlap to a degree, but pick out those in which the implications for fairness are
most salient.
As mentioned, ethical arguments are typically defeasible. One reason is that gen-
eral moral principles often admit exceptions. Ross (1930, 20) famously used the
term prima facie to indicate the conditional character of moral duties. A prima facie
duty is a duty at ﬁrst sight, a duty that may have to be qualiﬁed or retracted in light
of other considerations (Walton 2003, 9). Depending on other moral principles and/
or particular contextual features, a prima facie or conditional principle may be over-
ridden. This is germane to our topic, for in the OECD documents some background
variables are treated as categorically unfair as predictors of educational achievement,
whereas others are treated as merely conditionally unfair.
In the section called ‘Where are the big problems?’, the OECD illustrate ‘the
problem of unfairness’ by pointing out that across the OECD area, ‘children from
poorer homes are between three and four times more likely to be in the lowest scor-
ing group in mathematics at age 15’ (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 13).9 The inﬂu-
ence of parental economy on educational performance is here treated as
categorically unfair; it is neither a matter of degree nor conditional upon other fac-
tors. This type of correlation is regarded as unfair tout court. True, a lower odds
ratio would probably signify a lower degree of unfairness, but the unfairness is not
seen as a matter of degree in the sense that a sufﬁciently lower odds ratio would no
longer signify unfairness at all. It would perhaps have been less unfair if poor chil-
dren were, for example, only twice as likely to be in the lowest-scoring group, but it
would still be unfair. Nor is the unfairness of the effect of parental economy on edu-
cational performance treated as conditional upon other factors. This can be seen
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from a comparison with other inﬂuences on achievement: parental education and
home support.
In their second policy recommendation for equity in education, the so-called
‘Step 2’, the OECD advocate careful management of school choice, since school
choice poses a risk to equity in general and fairness in particular. One reason is that
well-educated (and better-off) parents have the resources to exploit that opportunity
and make better choices for their children, something which will ‘accelerate the pro-
gress of those who have already gained the best start in life from their parents’
(Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007). Parental education is therefore seen as at least a
risk to fairness, though it is not stated or implied that any correlation between paren-
tal education and school performance is unfair. That risk means that the inﬂuence of
parental education should be reduced through policy changes, for instance through
limiting school choice and academic selection, which will lessen well-educated par-
ents’ opportunities for making their education count as much.
Something similar applies to the OECD’s ‘Step 6’. The evidence shows that
parental support, such as helping with homework, is associated with school perfor-
mance. However, since resourceful parents involve themselves more with their chil-
dren’s education, parental support also poses a risk to fairness (Field, Pont, and
Kuczera 2007, 100–101). Once again, it is not stated or implied in the documents
that any correlation between home support and school performance is unfair. Unlike
the former factor (parental education), however, this risk is not sought to be reduced
by policies that make it more difﬁcult for resourceful parents to exploit their advan-
tage, but rather by raising the level of support for children of less resourceful par-
ents. This can for instance be done through after-school homework clubs and the
reinforcement of links between school and home (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007,
108).
In these documents, then, unlike parental income, which is treated as categori-
cally unfair as an inﬂuence on educational achievement, parental education and
home support are regarded as ‘merely’ conditionally unfair. However, the defeating
condition in the two cases is not, as it often is in these debates, parental rights, but
contextual features: more speciﬁcally, school policies. The effect of parental educa-
tion is seen as unfair if it is being used to gain an (additional) advantage through
school choice and selection (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 78). As I interpret the
documents, the OECD position can therefore be summed up thus: the advantage one
gains, in a myriad of ways, by having well-educated parents is not automatically
unfair, but it is unfair if that initial advantage is allowed to turn into an additional
advantage through school choice and selection, which will in turn lead to disadvan-
taged students acquiring an inferior education. Similarly, the inﬂuence of home sup-
port is unfair if there are no compensatory measures to support disadvantaged
students. For instance, the OECD do not recommend abolishing homework, but
instead advise schools to set up things like homework clubs in order to compensate
disadvantaged students (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 102–104). In this manner,
they also seek to avoid the levelling-down argument against educational fairness.
To sum up: the OECD explicitly operate with a loose idea of equal opportunity,
compatible with even a merely formal equality, but implicitly with a meritocratic
variant of fair equality of opportunity. The OECD principle of fairness can thus
seem very similar to John Rawls’ principle of fair equality of opportunity, which
says that people with equal talent (and motivation) should have equal chances of
succeeding:
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More speciﬁcally, assuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are
at the same level of talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them,
should have the same prospects of success regardless of their initial place in the social
system. In all sectors of society there should be roughly equal prospects of culture and
achievement for everyone similarly motivated and endowed. The expectations of those
with the same abilities and aspirations should not be affected by their social class.
(Rawls 1971, 63)
We shall return to Rawls’ position in the next section, but considered on its own,
the principle that Rawls formulates here for the social system as a whole seems sim-
ilar to the one with which the OECD implicitly operate for the educational system.
They diverge, however, in signiﬁcant ways.
There are three differences, which nevertheless are closely related. First, nowhere
in the OECD documents do we ﬁnd an explicit or implicit advocacy of a complete
eradication of the inﬂuence of social class. Whereas, Rawls states explicitly that
equally talented students should have the same prospects for success, the OECD do
not commit themselves to the ideal of eradicating the inﬂuence of class, only that it
should be of less importance. The aim, therefore, is not equality of opportunity, but
less inequality of opportunity.10 Second, the conditional unfairness of the inﬂuence
of parental education and home support introduces a signiﬁcant indeterminacy in the
question of educational justice. Statistics showing correlations between social back-
ground and educational attainment cannot then be taken ipso facto as a sign of sys-
temic unfairness. Third, rather than referring to equal chances or prospects or
probabilities, the OECD prefer the vague and metaphorical ‘obstacle’. When exactly
a certain variable, for example home support, goes from being an inﬂuence to being
an obstacle is neither stated nor easy to fathom. The combined effect of these three
differences is a signiﬁcant tempering of the OECD principle compared with that of
Rawls. Whether that is a strength or weakness is not for me to decide here.
Concluding discussion
One may speculate as to why the stronger notion of fairness is kept implicit in the
OECD documents. The OECD attempt to explain (or excuse) their lack of a clear
explicit notion of fairness by citing Levin, who claimed, in a paper commissioned
by the OECD, that while ‘we cannot deﬁne what [equity] is, we know when we are
far from it’ (2003, 5). Yet that rings false, since the OECD implicitly operate with a
more speciﬁc idea of fairness than the one they explicitly deﬁne, and also since
without such a speciﬁc idea, we could not even ‘know when we are far from it’. It
seems to me that a simpler and more reasonable explanation for the disparity
between the implicit and the explicit level is that the OECD have to cater to a vari-
ety of states, ranging from Scandinavian social democracies to Anglo-Saxon liberal
welfare states, to use Esping-Andersen’s famous typology (1990). That may have
led the OECD to soften a principle of fairness that in some political circles in some
of these states would have been seen as too radical.
Although it has not been my intention with this paper to evaluate or criticise the
normative argumentation in the OECD documents, I shall end by mentioning one
serious problem with it, since it bears on the relation between these documents and
others, and thus between education policy and other areas of public policy. This will
align the conclusion of the present paper with other critical perspectives on the
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OECD equity discourse; it will also reveal a deeper difference between the positions
of Rawls and the OECD.
To a large degree, the analysed documents isolate the question of educational
justice from the question of social justice in general. There is hardly any attempt to
relate fairness within the educational system to fairness within the social system in
general, be it on the micro-level of individual action or the macro-level of social
structure. Although there is an emphasis on equality of opportunity as a means
through which to achieve positions in the social hierarchy, there is on the one hand
no discussion of the rightfulness of that social hierarchy itself, nor, on the other, of
whether or not students from different social classes may fairly and legitimately sim-
ply choose different educational trajectories.
This criticism may seem unfair. After all, the documents with which I have been
concerned are on education, not on society as a whole. There are other white papers
in the OECD for that. Moreover, even the documents treated here do from time to
time highlight the links between educational equity and equity in general: ‘Fair and
inclusive education is one of the most powerful levers available to make society
more equitable’ (Field, Pont, and Kuczera 2007, 11) and ‘success in improving
equity in education also depends upon other policies (e.g. health, housing, welfare,
justice, social development)’ (OECD 2012a, 18). Nevertheless, this is not sufﬁcient
to parry the criticism made above, since these links are causal in nature whereas the
criticism under consideration here trades on the idea that educational justice is partly
constituted by general social justice. The point is that one simply cannot determine,
from looking at the educational system alone and the correlations between its inputs
and outputs, whether or not that system is fair. Hence, one cannot distinguish fair-
ness in education from fairness in society as a whole and treat them as though they
were two separate questions, belonging to two different departments.
Other scholars have arrived at similar conclusions. Sellar and Lingard (2013a,
723) note that while PISA focus on the equity of schooling systems, the OECD
often omit consideration of ‘structural inequality in society beyond schooling’ as
explanation of educational inequities. As part of his argument that egalitarianism is
beneﬁcial to educational excellence, Condron (2011, 54) likewise contends that ‘it is
problematic to think that schools can reduce achievement disparities by themselves’,
since schools are ‘embedded within the economic systems of their societies’. The
same conclusion is drawn by Reay (2012, 592–593): ‘Educational inequalities are
inextricably bound up with social inequalities and cannot be addressed in isolation
from them’. Yet these scholars do not distinguish clearly or explicitly between a cau-
sal and a constitutive relation between educational and social justice. By distinguish-
ing these, my study has allowed a more precise understanding of the way in which
the OECD isolate educational fairness from social justice in general.
We are now in a position to see the deeper difference between Rawls’ view of
equality of opportunity and that of the OECD. For Rawls, fair equality of opportu-
nity is only one part of the story. Social inequalities must also fulﬁl the condition set
by the so-called difference principle: they must be to the greatest beneﬁt of the worst
off (Rawls 1971, 302). This implies, according to Rawls, that the degree of inequal-
ity must not become so large so as to undermine the self-respect of the least advan-
taged (107). The distributive implications of Rawls’ theory therefore go far beyond
that of the principle of fair equality of opportunity alone. When equality of
opportunity is seen in tandem with the difference principle, it also becomes clear
that Rawls’ theory does not imply meritocracy: if there are to be positions of
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advantage, then the justiﬁcation cannot be that the advantaged deserve their
positions, seeing that their advantage largely depends on natural and social fortune
(103–104). Although Rawls does not go as far as to support radical equality of
opportunity, since he favours a social structure where the effects of differences in
talent are not redressed but rather ‘work for the good of the least fortunate’ (102),
neither does he support the meritocratic variant of equality of opportunity that we
ﬁnd in the OECD documents.
Rawls’ position also implies that the fairness of the educational system ulti-
mately depends on the fairness of the structure of society as a whole and cannot be
determined by the principle of equal educational opportunity alone. Whether a par-
ticular pattern of correlations between social background and educational perfor-
mance is fair or unfair will in this view depend on the degree to which society in
general, and its distributive pattern in particular, is fair or unfair. For instance, in a
fully just society, it might not matter or might even be a good thing if parents trans-
mit their skills, knowledge, values, and good habits in such a way that their children
will tend to take up the same occupations as they have. However, in a society
marked by large and unjust inequalities, that very same kind of reproduction is mor-
ally problematic. For this kind of egalitarian, the real problem is not that the occupa-
tional structure is partly reproduced through education, but that this structure is one
of great inequality in status, power, and other resources. This perspective is absent
from the analysed policy documents: While the OECD insist strongly that coming
from a disadvantaged home should not be a disadvantage in education, they do not
question whether there should be disadvantaged homes at all.
Notes
1. I shall start out by using ‘social background’ in an open and unspeciﬁed sense, since
part of the aim of the article is to discover which factors OECD think should and should
not be allowed to inﬂuence educational performance. Furthermore, ‘performance’ and
‘achievement’ will, unless speciﬁed, refer to both length, results (grades), and type
(prestige) of education.
2. An important exception is the work of Adam Swift and Harry Brighouse.
3. Unfortunately, space does not allow me to compare this set of documents with earlier
OECD policy documents. Thus, I am no position to decide whether or not the position
of fairness I outline here is evidence of change or stability in the OECD’s position. For
a treatment of the OECD educational policy before 2007, see Rizvi and Lingard (2006).
4. The ﬁrst two steps are not strictly separated, since merely to identify something as a
claim and something else as a reason for that claim is already to have some idea of the
structure as a whole.
5. Marginson (2011) also focuses attention on the tension between fairness and inclusion.
He thinks (26) that of those two, inclusion should be the primary value and target. He
also associates the two values, fairness and inclusion, with two differing philosophical
traditions with regards to social justice, a utopian and a realist, respectively, but I ﬁnd
this part of his analysis less convincing.
6. At this point, I depart from Walton’s ‘chained’ or ‘layered’ model (2003).
7. Of course, one possibility is that the particular policy is in outright conﬂict with the nor-
mative principle; in that case, the argument is a bad one. As mentioned, though, my aim
here is not to assess the quality of the argument, but only to identify one premise of it.
8. Walton argues convincingly that there is nothing inherently wrong with or fallacious
about using loaded terms in argumentation (2003).
9. ‘Poor’ is here deﬁned relatively as those belonging to the lowest socio-economic group.
The relation between relative and absolute deﬁnitions of poverty is important for the
question of how the OECD understand the normative signiﬁcance of poverty and social
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inequality. Unfortunately, space does not allow me to go into this topic here, since it
will take us too far into issues of general social policy (OECD 2011).
10. As explained above, I have not considered effort and motivation in this article, since
the OECD documents simply do not give us enough to go on in that respect. Further-
more, I have also disregarded the possibility that natural talent is not equally distributed
among social classes. Rawls seems to assume that both natural talent and effort/motiva-
tion (at least one aspect of it) are independent of class.
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